Charity Hospital of New Orleans

Charity Hospital of New Orleans became a striking counterpoint in the account of Hurricane Katrina: although it faced flooding, power and communications failures, and a delayed evacuation, its staff sustained care and took the sickest patients out first. The contrast was not one of easy conditions or abundant resources. It was a story of preparation, improvisation, and the choices workers made under pressure.

Public Hospital Under Extreme Strain

During the disaster, Charity Hospital flooded and lost power, functioning plumbing, computers, telephones, and elevators. It had no helipad and no corporate overseers able to assist. Its public-hospital workforce faced a larger patient burden than Memorial Medical Center: approximately twice as many patients were present across Charity’s two campuses, with a lower staff-to-patient ratio.

The evacuation was also prolonged. Transferring all of Charity’s patients took until Friday afternoon, September 2, 2005, a day after patients had been evacuated from Memorial Medical Center. Fewer than ten patients died, according to the account, though estimates vary among sources. The low death toll therefore belongs alongside, not in place of, the hospital’s severe operational difficulties.

Those difficulties included threats and confusion beyond the building’s physical failures. Doctors described a reported gunman on a nearby roof disrupting evacuation; more than a hundred psychiatric patients were inside. People urinated on stair landings, and convoys trying to reach the hospital over water were reportedly shot at and looted. News reports suggested Charity had already been evacuated when it had not, while soldiers brought additional ventilator-dependent patients to the hospital.

Preparation and Improvised Power

Charity’s response drew on preparations made before the storm. Hospital officials had drilled for a Category Three hurricane and levee failure. With federal preparedness funds made available after the September 11 attacks, they had acquired portable generators, oxygen-powered ventilators, and a ham-radio system; security officers also received special disaster training.

When ordinary power failed, staff siphoned gasoline from cars to fuel ten small portable generators. Those generators powered ventilators and cardiac monitors in the intensive care units, helping keep critically ill patients alive, including a very premature baby. At Memorial Medical Center, by contrast, staff hand-ventilated patients with Ambu bags after power failed; two similar generators were later used for lighting and fans in common areas and at the helipad, rather than for medical equipment. The comparison makes Charity’s practical preparation visible in the specific work its equipment could still perform.

Morale, Routine, and Rumor Control

The hospital’s leaders worked to preserve coordination and morale as well as equipment. Every four hours, they held lobby meetings attended by everyone from doctors to janitorial staff. Workers staged a talent show by flashlight, painted, and laughed. These activities offered a shared routine amid conditions that could otherwise have made the hospital feel wholly beyond control.

Staff also maintained ordinary care practices where they could. Physical and occupational therapy continued; workers were encouraged to keep regular shifts and sleep schedules. Leaders tried to contain rumors with a rule of disciplined reporting: “You can only say it if you’ve seen it.” Maintaining routine and limiting unverified claims helped keep panic down while the evacuation and rescue effort continued.

Evacuation Priorities and Significance

The decisive difference in patient prioritization was that Charity’s leaders did not classify a group of patients as too ill to rescue. The sickest patients were taken out first, rather than being left until last. That approach sharply contrasts with the decision at Memorial Medical Center to place patients with do-not-resuscitate orders last in the evacuation sequence, including ICU patients whose lives depended on intensive support.

Charity’s experience does not erase its losses or the formidable dangers its staff faced. It shows instead that comparable or worse threats did not dictate a single response: advance preparation, improvised use of equipment, communication, routine, and evacuation priorities shaped what care remained possible. In the book’s comparison of New Orleans hospitals, Charity stands as evidence that even under profound scarcity, institutional choices could preserve a commitment to patients most at risk.